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In the ﬁeld of Supply Chain Risk Management, the attitude of managers toward risk affect the tactical
decision-making process in collaborative supply chains under an uncertain environment, concerning
especially capacity levels, lot-sizing rules, purchasing strategies, production scheduling,…, etc. The issue
can be formulated as a sequential decision problem under uncertainty where the customer decisions affect
the decisions made by the supplier. In this paper we deal with two kinds of uncertainties. The ﬁrst one is
the uncertainty on the indicators of performance (which are not comparable) used by the decision maker
to choose a solution (for example: service quality or inventory cost). Hence, we propose an approach based
on subjective probability to evaluate the probability that a decision is optimal for the ﬁrst actor and the
probability that it is optimal for both. From these two evaluations, we propose a ranking function to help
the ﬁrst actor to take into account the second one when selecting a decision. The second kind of
uncertainty pertains to the demand. A classical criterion under total uncertainty is Hurwicz criterionwhere
a weight expresses a degree of pessimism. Nevertheless, the degree of pessimism is itself ill-known. Thus,
it becomes difﬁcult to take into account the behavior of the actors. Hence, we propose an approach based
on possibility theory and the so-called pignistic transform, which computes a subjective probability
distribution over the criteria. Then, we apply the method used for uncertain criterion. This approach is
illustrated through an example and an industrial case study.
1. Introduction
In an increasingly competitive business world, where the
sources of disturbance are drastically changing and increasing,
supply chains actors are faced with the necessity to constantly
improve their decision-making practices. The companies identify-
ing supply chain risk as “an unavoidable and necessary task that
continues to pose certain problems” (Lavastre et al., 2012). Faced
with a “networked environment”, “companies deepen their rela-
tionship with partners and thus become more dependent on each
other” (Hallikas et al., 2005). Risk, in the context of an enterprise,
is deﬁned by Zsidisin (2003) as: “the danger that events or
decisions will obstruct the company's achievement of its objec-
tives”. In this context, “The process of supply chain actors main can
either amplify or absorb the effect of risks in the supply chain”
(Juttner, 2005) when the principal risk comes from supply and
demand. Mastering the decision making processes of actors is
therefore a key to minimizing the risks.
In this paper, we focus on the problem of designing the
collaborative purchasing processes in the supply chain context
under uncertainty. Moreover, we speciﬁcally consider a supplier-
customer relationship in a dyadic supply chain where actors are
independent. This situation may be described as a 2-actor sequen-
tial decision problem. For an industrial Decision-Maker (DM) in a
supply chain, the anticipation of the decisional behavior of his/her
partners is common practice (capacity level, lot sizing rules,
purchasing strategies, production scheduling…). He/she knows
that his/her decision will be followed by a series of partner's
decisions, which will impact the performance of his decision. The
decisional behaviors of independent partners are extremely difﬁ-
cult to anticipate. These potential different behaviors can be
interpreted as different sources of uncertainty for a particular
actor of the chain.
In this paper, we deal with two sources of uncertain behavior.
First, we consider the uncertainty of an actor about the performance
criteria of the other actor (for instance one considers the inventory
level whereas the other the service quality), criteria that are not
commensurate. Moreover, we deal with behaviors under uncertainty
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(the pessimism or optimism of decision maker) which comes down
of the occurrence of uncertain events (scraps, breakdowns, delays,
demand ﬂuctuations…) for which a probability distribution may not
be accessible. Hence, in the context of uncertainty, the criterion
should take into account the level of pessimism of decision makers.
This paper is organized in 7 sections. First, a literature review
on supply chains is made (Section 2), then we provide some
background on decision trees, possibility theory, pignistic prob-
ability, criteria under uncertainty and multi-actors decision that
will be used in our proposal (Section 3). In the fourth section, we
present our approach to model and support the decision-making
process with one DM and then we propose a model for sequential
multi-DM problem (Sections 5 and 6). Finally, Section 7 illustrates
this proposal through an industrial case study.
2. Literature review
In our review, we distinguish the literature that focuses on
minimizing risk in supply chains under uncertainty and the
literature on coordination mechanisms inside the supply chain.
On the ﬁrst topic, mostly optimization approaches have been
proposed with a global supply chain optimization model and a
single decision maker (Liang and Cheng, 2009; Peidro et al., 2009;
Wang and Shu, 2005; Petrovic et al., 1999). Besides there exist
robust optimization methods where suppliers share information
with the customer (Guillaume et al., 2012, 2013). In these studies,
the sources of uncertainty pertain to the demand, supply and
process. Nevertheless, predeﬁned criteria are used and the pro-
blem of distributed decision is not investigated, whereas it creates
risks since the decisions made by suppliers impact decisions made
by the customer.
Besides, the studies on coordination mechanisms focus on the
minimization of sub-optimality of the distributed decision in the
supply chain. Hence, an important part of the literature proposes
and studies coordination mechanisms to obtain the optimal deci-
sion for the supply chain as a whole. For example, game theory is
used for designing coordination mechanisms that may optimize the
distributed system and studying coordination mechanisms as a
form of cooperative advertising; see Aust and Buscher (2014) for a
recent review. On their side, Chen, 2007, 2012 and Li et al., 2005
focus on procurement policy (price-only policies, quantity discount
policy, etc.). Recently, Xiao et al. (2014) added the lead time as
decision variable, on top of the price in context of make to order
supply chains. Furthermore, the supply chains studied in this
literature are mostly manufacturer-retailer supply chains, and these
studies do not consider the planning process. Another part of this
literature proposes coordination mechanism when the actors use
linear mathematic models for production planning (Dudek and
Stadtler, 2005) under perfect demand. In this part of the literature,
the criterion of decision makers is predeﬁned and the uncertainty is
not taken into account. Moreover, in addition to this important
academic research works, empirical analysis based on industrial
case studies and decision-maker interviews have emphasized the
fact that conceptual research has focused on the supply disruption
risk with a little attention to the questions:
(i) “How views of supply disruption risk are developed and how
these views affect the decision-making process” (Ellis et al.,
2010),
(ii) What are supply chain managers' attitudes toward risk?
(iii) What are the ways in which decisions are made? (Lavastre et
al., 2012)?
Moreover, Singh and Benyoucef (2013) emphasize the role of
decision-making processes inside collaborative supply chains.
It shows the difﬁculty to establish decisions when confronted
with conﬂicting individual interests and where “every company is
responsible for its own risks and identiﬁes the risks from its own
viewpoint” (Hallikas et al., 2005).
3. Background
In this section, we recall formal tools we shall use to build the
proposed approach.
3.1. Tools for decision under imprecision
In this section, we recall a model to represent the imprecision
on the information (possibility distributions), how to derive a
subjective probability from it (pignistic probability), a well-known
criterion under total uncertainty.
3.1.1. Possibility distributions
Imprecise information is modeled by expressions of the form
vAA where A is a subset of S that contains more than one element.
Imprecision is always expressed by a disjunction of values (Dubois
and Prade, 2009) that form a possibility distribution on S. The
assertion vAA implies that all values from v outside A are
supposed to be impossible.
A possibility distribution πv attached to an ill-known quantity v
quantiﬁes the plausibility of values taken by v (Dubois and Prade,
1988). It is a function from S to a plausibility scale L ([0,1] for
numerical possibility). A numerical possibility distribution taking a
ﬁnite number of values λiA ½0; 1", for i¼1,…,M, may express
imprecise probabilistic knowledge of the form P(Ei)Z1$λi, i¼1,
…,M, where Ei is a conﬁdence set provided by the DM (Dubois and
Prade, 2009). It can also be viewed as a random set ðm; FÞπ , with
focal sets Ei and masses mðEiÞ; such that:
Ei ¼ fxASjπðxÞZλig
mðEiÞ ¼ λi$λi$1
(
ð1Þ
The possibility distribution is then such that: πðxÞ ¼∑x AEimðEiÞ
(Dubois and Prade, 1982).
3.1.2. Pignistic probability distribution
The so-called pignistic probability extends Laplace principle of
insufﬁcient reason to possibility theory and to belief functions. It
presupposes the idea that, while the knowledge or an actor can be
too imprecise to be represented by a single probability distribu-
tion, the latter is needed when evaluating decisions in order to
comply with the classical (Savage) decision theory (Smets, 2005).
This probability distribution reﬂects betting odds used by the actor
possessing a certain body of information. When the actor has no
information, all alternatives are viewed as equally possible and the
actor will bet on them at equal odds. Deriving the pignistic
probability from a belief function consists in equally sharing the
masses ðm; FÞ over each element of focal set E for a random set
ðm; FÞ
PgsðxÞ ¼ ∑
EDS
mðEÞ
jEj
8xAS ð2Þ
It can be viewed as the subjective probability distribution the
decision-maker would provide via betting rates, had his knowl-
edge been faithfully represented by the possibility distribution πv.
This probability distribution has been proposed by Dubois and
Prade (1982) and axiomatized by Smets (2005), who coined it
“pignistic”. It coincides with the (older) Shapley value (Shapley,
1953) in the game theory. The pignistic probability distribution
can be applied to possibility distributions and is also used in the
simulation of “fuzzy variables” (Chanas and Nowakowski, 1988).
Example 1. For example, let Πðc1Þ ¼ 1 and Πðc2Þ ¼ 0:8 be a
possibility distribution over two possible criteria. It expresses the
incomplete information that the probability that the actor uses
criterion c1 is at least 0.2, while the other one is unknown. Let us
compute the pignistic probability of each criterion. First, we
compute the masses mðEiÞ. In this case, the values of λi are discrete
values: λ0 ¼ 0; λ1 ¼ 0:8; λ2 ¼ 1. Then:
$ E1 ¼ fc
1; c2g with mðE1Þ ¼ 0:8$0¼ 0:8
$ E2 ¼ fc
1g with mðE2Þ ¼ 1$0:8¼ 0:2
From Eq. (6) we have: Pgðc1Þ ¼ ðmðE1Þ=2ÞþðmðE2Þ=1Þ ¼ ð0:8=2Þþ
0:2¼ 0:6 and ðc2Þ ¼ ðmðE1Þ=2Þ ¼ ð0:8=2Þ ¼ 0:4.
While in the ﬁnite case, letting the DM directly provide such
subjective probability degrees may be possible, it is too difﬁcult for
a DM to provide precise continuous subjective probability. In that
case, it is more user-friendly to ask for weak information (like
support and mode, or conﬁdence intervals), to represent it faith-
fully in possibility theory, and then to extract the pignistic
probability from it.
3.1.3. Hurwicz criterion
Hurwicz (1951) criterion for decision under total uncertainty is
a parametric criterion which takes into account the optimism of
decision maker. Let D¼ fd1; ::; dng be the set of possible decisions,
S the set of possible states of the world, X the set of the potential
consequences of the decisions, f di ðsÞAX the function deﬁned for
each decision diAD which associates to each state sAS a precise
consequence xAX, uðf dðsÞÞAℝ the utility function that attaches a
value to each consequence xAX and α the degree of pessimism of
decision maker. The Hurwicz criterion achives a trade-off between
the most cautious and the most risk evaluations:
Huðf dÞ ¼ α,min
sA S
ðuðf dðsÞÞÞþð1$αÞ ,max
sA S
ðuðf dðsÞÞÞ ð3Þ
dn ¼ argmax
dAD
ðHuðf dÞÞ ð4Þ
3.2. Tools for multi-actors decision making
In this section, we recall the model of sequential decision more
precisely, namely decision trees and an egalitarist approach to
multifactorial ranking of decisions: leximin.
3.2.1. Decision tree
In a real dynamic situation, the DM does not make a single
decision, but a sequence thereof, according to the successive arrivals
of relevant pieces of information. This type of problem is called
dynamic decision under uncertainty. The decision made at time t
depends on the information available at t. By hypothesis, the
information known at time t is still known at time tþΔt. The
incoming information is commonly viewed as “events”. They are the
results of an external independent entity, for example nature. In
such conditions, we can call βt ¼ fe
1
t ;…; e
m
t g and βtþ1 ¼
fe1tþ1;…; e
n
tþ1g the sets of mutually exclusive and exhaustive events
at time t and tþ1. The set βtþ1 reﬁnes a partition of states induced
by the set βt . We call D¼ fD1;…;DT g the set of decisions that have
been made at various times, where decision Dt is made at time t.
This kind of problem has motivated many research works
especially in the Artiﬁcial Intelligence literature (Nielsen and
Jaffray, 2006; Jeantet et al., 2008; Jaffray and Jeleva, 2008). They
are relevant in situations where a DM has a sequence of decisions
(at prescribed times) to make. In this context, a strategy, called Δ,
is deﬁned as a particular choice of decisions (one decision per
possible situation). The set of all strategies is denoted by Δ. The
target is therefore to support the DM who must choose the best
strategy, Δ
n
¼ argmax
ΔAΔ
ðuðΔÞÞ. All decisions are known when the
strategy is applied.
A Decision Tree (DT) is often used to represent this kind of
decisions. A DT may be deﬁned as a directed acyclic graph
T ¼ ðN ;ℰÞ where N is the set of nodes and ε the set of arcs and
there exists a unique node (root node), fromwhich there is a single
path leading to any other node. The set of nodes is made of
(Nielsen and Jaffray, 2006):
– N D: the set of decision nodes (represented by squares). They
characterize states where the DM has to decide and to choose
one alternative among several ones. Each output arc of a
decision node represents an alternative (some d AD);
– N c: the set of chance (or event) nodes (represented by circles).
Event nodes represent the sources of uncertainty in the
problem, i.e. states of nature. Each output arc of an event node
shows a possible state of the world after the event has occurred
(some eAE );
– C: the set of terminal nodes (leaves). A leaf is deﬁned as a node
without children ðchildðNÞ ¼∅; 8NACÞ and represents a term-
inal state of the sequential decision problem (a ﬁnal conse-
quence). A utility value is associated to each terminal node
ðuðNÞ; 8NACÞ.
In a decision tree, a strategy Δ is therefore deﬁned as a set
of arcs: Δ¼ fðN;N0Þ : NAN
DΔ
;N0AN Δg Dℰ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
a2þb2
p
where
N
DΔ
¼ N D \ N
Δ and N ΔDN is the set of nodes involved in the
strategy Δ, i.e. the set of nodes made of:
– The root node: Nr (a decision by hypothesis);
– A unique child for each decision made according to the strategy,
i.e. NAN
DΔ
;
– All the children of an event node met in the strategy, i.e.
NAN cΔ ¼N c \ N
Δ.
We call Δ
T
, the set of strategies in a given DT, T. An example of
DT is given on Fig. 1.
It represents a decision situation where a DM has to decide at
node D1, then the event E1 will occur, after what a second decision
at D2 will be made followed by a last event E2. Formally:
– N D ¼ fD1;D2g, with D1 ¼ fd
1
1; d
2
1g and D2 ¼ fd
1
2; d
2
2g;
– N c ¼ fE1; E2g, with S1 ¼ fe
1
1; e
2
1g and S2 ¼ fe
1
2; e
2
2g;
– β1 ¼ fe
1
1; e
2
1g and β2 ¼ fe
1
1 \ e
1
2; e
1
1 \ e
2
2; e
2
1 \ e
1
2; e
2
1 \ e
2
2g:
One example of strategy is pictured in Fig. 1 (in bold).
Enumerating the strategies may become a very hard computa-
tional problem because of the complexity of the decision situation
(the number of strategies increases exponentially). Different
methods have been proposed to ﬁnd the best strategy
(Hammond, 1988; Machina, 1989; McClennen, 1990; Nielsen and
Jaffray, 2006).
Considering a multiple actor sequential game, algorithms based
on the Dynamic Programming principle, i.e., backward induction,
have to be preferred to search and ﬁnd (if they exist) equilibria in
this kind of game (Cachon and Netessine, 2006).
3.2.2. Leximin criterion
In the next section we shall use the leximin criterion to build a
ranking function taking into account the collective satisfaction of
several decision-makers without favoring any of them.
Deﬁnition 1. (Barbera and Jackson, 1988) Let ujðdÞ; jAf1;…;mg be
the levels of satisfaction of the DMj for decision d, and aA ½0;1",
we deﬁne Jða; dÞ ¼ fjjujðdÞrag and jJða; dÞj the cardinality of Jða; dÞ.
We write ug Lmv if decision u is preferred to the decision v using
the leximin criterion. The leximin is deﬁned as follows (Eq. (5)):
ug Lmv2(a such that jJða;uÞjo jJða; vÞj&8boajJðb;uÞj ¼ jJðb; vÞj
ð5Þ
This criterion can also be deﬁned by ﬁrst reordering compo-
nents of vectors u and as v in increasing order, and then ranking
the two rearranged vectors in lexicographic order (see also Dubois
et al., 1996). The leximin optimal decision can be interpreted in the
context of multi-actor decision-making as an egalitarist solution.
4. Ranking decisions taking into account uncertainty on
criteria
In this section, we present how a DM can make decision under
uncertainty about his/her own criterion. Here we focus on the case
where the criteria are not commensurable so an aggregation of
ratings is not allowed. In this context, we suppose that the DM is
satisﬁed if the decision dAD is optimal and not satisﬁed other-
wise. More formally, the utility function of DM is:
uðdÞ ¼
1 if decision d is optimal
0 otherewise
$
Moreover, we distinguish the case where the criteria are
discrete (set of distinct criteria) and the case where the criterion
has an imprecise parameter especially we focus on the case where
the optimism degree of Hurwicz criterion is imprecise.
4.1. Discrete case
In the discrete case, we consider that the DM is able to give a
subjective probability on each possible criterion cAC noted PgðcÞ.
The DM will take the decision that maximizes the expected value:
dn ¼ argmaxdADð∑cACPgðcÞuðdÞÞ.
Example 2. C ¼ fc1; c2; c3g with the subjective probability
Pgðc1Þ ¼ 0:4, Pgðc2Þ ¼ 0:3 and Pgðc2Þ ¼ 0:3 and the set of decisions
D¼ fd1; d2; d3g. Decisions d1 and d3 are both optimal for the
criterion c1, d2 is optimal for criteria c2and c3. So, the evaluation
for each decision is: 0:4, 1þ0:3, 0þ0:3, 0¼ 0:4 for d1, 0:4,
0þ0:3, 1þ0:3, 1¼ 0:6 for d2 and 0:4 for d3. The optimal
decision is d2.
4.2. Model of imprecise degree of optimism
The model is based on the hypothesis that DM is able to give
possibility distributions on the value of α: a possibility distribution
~α on his/her degree of optimism. Those possibility distributions
can model vague adjectives like: pessimistic, optimistic, neutral (see
Fig. 2(a)) or more precise as very pessimistic, little pessimistic,
strongly neutral, (see Fig. 2(b)). Another way is to ask for the most
plausible value of α and the maximal interval that contains α. We
can then build a triangular possibility distribution with these three
values (see Fig. 2(c)).
Based on these possibility distributions and the study of change
decision point (see Fig. 3), we can evaluate the stability of decisions
(which in our approach comes down to computing the pignistic
probability of being optimal). More precisely, we ﬁrst build the
pignistic probability distribution from the possibility distribution (cf
Section 3.1.2), then compute the pignistic probability for each decision
to be optimal. Namely, Pgðd¼ optimalÞ ¼ Pgðαϵ½αd ;αd "Þ with ½αd ;αd "
the interval of values of α where d is optimal. As before, DM will
choose the decision that maximizes the expected value: dn ¼
argmaxdADðPgðd¼ optimalÞuðdÞÞ .
Example 3. consider two decisions d1 and d2 with respectively the
minimal value equal 10 and 8 and maximal equal 25 and 30. So the
Fig. 1. Example of Decision Tree.
Hurwicz criteria of both decisions yield Huðd
1
Þ ¼ α, 10þð1$αÞ ,
25 and Huðd
2
Þ ¼ α, 8þð1$αÞ , 30 (see Fig. 4).
If αA ½ð5=7Þ;1" the decision d1 is optimal so ½α
d1
;α
d1
" ¼ ½ð5=7Þ;1"
and Pgðαϵ½ð5=7Þ;1"Þﬃ0:9.
If αA ½0; ð5=7Þ" the decision d2 is optimal so ½α
d2
;α
d2
" ¼ ½0; ð5=7Þ"
and Pgðαϵ½0; ð5=7Þ"Þﬃ0:1.
Hence, the utility of DM for decision d1 is 0.9 and 0.1 for d2.
Finally, DM chooses d1.
5. Sequential decision problem taking into account
uncertainty on criteria
In this section, we ﬁrst introduce the main principles of our
method of ranking decisions in a game with two players when
(i) DM1 makes his decision before DM2 and (ii) DM1 only partially
knows his/her own criterion and likewise for DM2 criterion.
Moreover, we consider that under uncertainty on the criteria,
the DM focuses on optimal decisions for each criterion. In other
words, a decision may satisfy the DM if it is optimal for at least one
criterion. Otherwise the decision is not considered.
We adopt the following notations:
– Ci: set of criteria ci of DMi with i¼ 1; 2
– D1: set of decisions d1 of DM1
Fig. 2. Choice of the possibility distribution.
Fig. 3. Decision using Hurwicz criterion.
Fig. 4. Decision under imprecise optimism degree.
– D2j : set of decisions d
2
j of DM2 such that DM1 chooses decision j,
j being the index of decision node of DM1 with j¼ 1;…; J and
J ¼ jD1j
– D¼D21 ,…, D
2
J : set of decision vectors d
2
%!
¼ ðd21;…; d
2
J Þ of DM2
– C2ð d
2
%!
Þ: set of criteria c2AC2 for which decision vector d2
%!
is
optimal.
– C1;2ðd
1
; d2
%!
Þ: set of pairs of criteria ðc1; c2Þ for which d1 is
optimal for c1AC1 and d2
%!
is optimal for c2AC2.
– C1ðd
1
Þ: set of pairs of criteria ðc1; c2Þ for which decision d1 is
optimal
– C12ðd
1
Þ: set of criteria c2AC2 for which decision d1 is the best
decision of DM1 for the DM2 using c
2
– PgðciÞ: Pignistic probability of criterion ci
– Pgðd1jDM1Þ: is the pignistic probability that d
1 is an optimal
decision from the point of view of DM1. The optimality of the
decision depends on the criterion c1of DM1 and the criterion
c2of DM2. It depends on the probability of using c
1and c2. So
Pgðd1jDM1Þ is the sum of the probabilities of pairs ðc
1; c2Þ for
which d1 is optimal.
– Pgðd1jDM2Þ: is the pignistic probability that d
1 is an optimal
decision from the point of view of DM2. In other terms, the
pignistic probability induced when the choice of d1 is optimal
for the DM2.
– uiðdÞ ¼
1 if decision d is optimal
0 otherwise
$
the utility function for
DMi with dAD
i
5.1. Overview of the approach
To evaluate the probability that the decision d is optimal in
front of the possible criteria, we use the concept of pignistic
probabilities (i.e. Section 3.1.2). Indeed the decision that has the
maximal expected value to be optimal (using pignistic probability)
is the one that is most likely to be optimal, taking into account the
uncertainty on the criterion. Note that the expected value of DMi,
Ei½d"; with utility function uiðdÞ, is equivalent to the pignistic
probability that d is an optimal decision from the point of view
of DMi: PgðdjDMiÞ. So in the next part of the paper we will use the
notation PgðdjDMiÞ to refer to this expected value.
Since the decision of DM1 affects the possible decision of DM2,
we propose to evaluate the decision of DM1 using the points of
view of DM1 and DM2. Formally we assign a pair of valuesðad1 ;bd1 Þ
to each decision d1AD1 where a
d1
¼ Pgðd1jDM1Þ and
b
d1
¼ Pgðd1jDM2Þ.
In order to compute the pignistic probability that decision is
optimal, we have to know for which criteria this decision is optimal
and then to sum the pignistic probabilities of these criteria. More-
over, we propose to rank the decisions using the importance given
by DM1 to DM2. This importance is linked to the kind of relationship
among DM1 and DM2. For instance DM1 will grant a high level of
importance to her/his strategic or/and constraining partners
whereas his/her non strategic and/or dependant partners will have
a low level of importance (Marcotte et al., 2009).
5.2. Evaluation of decisions under uncertain criteria
The problem of computing the chance of optimality for DM1
and DM2 can be computed in 6 steps:
– Step 1. Computation of C2ð d
2
%!
Þ for each vector d2
%!
AD, as
follows:
C2ð d
2
%!
Þ¼ fc2j d2
%!
is optimalg ð6Þ
– Step 2. Computation of C1;2ðd
1
; d2
%!
Þ for each vector
d2
%!
Af d2
%!
jC2ð d
2
%!
Þa∅g and each decision d1AD1, as follows:
C1;2ðd
1
; d2
%!
Þ¼ fðc1; c2Þjd1 and d2
%!
are optimalg ð6Þ
– Step 3. Computation of C1ðd
1
Þ ¼ [
d2
%!
AD
C1;2ðd
1
; d2
%!
Þ for each
d1AD1
– Step 4. Computation of Pgðd1jDM1Þ as follows:
Pgðd1jDM1Þ ¼ ∑
ðc1 ;c2ÞAC1ðd
1
Þ
Pgðc1Þ , Pgðc2Þ ð8Þ
– Step 5. Computation of C12ðd
1
Þ for each decision d1AD1as
follows:
C12ðd
1
Þ ¼ fc2jd1 ¼ argmin
d1AD1
ðmin
d2AD2
d1
c2ðd1; d2ÞÞg ð9Þ
– Step 6. Computation of Pgðd1jDM2Þ as follows:
Pgðd1jDM2Þ ¼ ∑
c2AC12ðd
1
Þ
Pgðc2Þ ð10Þ
5.3. Taking into account the importance given to the point of view of
DM2
To help ssthe DM1 choose a decision, we propose to rank the
possible optimal solutions according to the importance given to the
point of view of DM2. If the importance given by DM1 to DM2 is very
low, then she/he chooses the decision which maximizes her/his
probability to be optimal for her/him. On the contrary, if the
importance given by DM1 to DM2 is very high, then she/he chooses
the decision which maximizes the probability for DM2. Between
these extremes, different levels of importance will be considered.
More formally let f 12 be the utility of a decision of DM1 from the point
of view of DM2 (the latter being measured by Pgðd
1
jDM2Þ.
The function f 12 is a mapping Pgðd
1
jDM2ÞA ½0;1"↦½$1;1" that
has to respect two requirements:
2 If DM1 grants very low importance to DM2:
Pgðd1jDM1Þ4 f
1
2ðPgðd
1
jDM2ÞÞ; 8Pgðd
1
jDM1ÞA ½0;1"
2 If DM1 grants the same importance to DM2 as to himself:
Pgðd1jDM2Þ ¼ f
1
2ðPgðd
1
jDM2ÞÞ; 8Pgðd
1
jDM2Þ; A ½0;1"
To respect these characteristics, we propose that f 12ðPgðd
1
j
DM2ÞÞ ¼ Pgðd
1
jDM2Þþs
1
2 with s
1
2A ½$1;1" such that if s
1
2 ¼ 1 the
importance given by DM1 to DM2 is very low otherwise if s
1
2 ¼ $1
then the importance given by DM1 to DM2 is very high.
In order to ﬁnd the decision that ensures equity between the
two decision makers DM1 and DM2 taking into account the
importance given by DM1 to DM2, we propose to use the leximin
criterion on the vector v¼ 〈Pgðd1jDM1Þ; f
1
2ðPgðd
1
jDM2ÞÞ〉. There are
sevsseral cases:
2 if s12 ¼ 1 (very low importance given by DM1 to DM2): we
maximize ﬁrst Pgðd1jDM1Þ and then f
1
2ðPgðd
1
jDM2ÞÞ such that
Pgðd1jDM1ÞrPgðd
1
jDM2Þþ1, 8 Pgðd
1
jDM1Þ; Pgðd
1
jDM2ÞA ½0;1"
2 if s12 ¼ 0 (no difference between DM1and DM2): we maximize
indifferently the minimum between Pgðd1jDM1Þ and Pgðd
1
j
DM2Þ and the other
2 if s12 ¼ $1 (very high importance given by DM1 to DM2): we
maximize ﬁrst f 12ðPgðd
1
jDM2ÞÞ and then Pgðd
1
jDM1Þ such that
Pgðd1jDM2Þ$1rPgðd
1
jDM1Þ, 8Pgðd
1
jDM1Þ; Pgðd
1
jDM2ÞA ½0;1".
Note that we do not ask the decision-maker DM1 for parameter
s12. It is just an artifact of the method. By letting parameter s
1
2 range
over its domain, we can explainwhether a decision made by DM1 is
likely to be accepted or not by DM2 in all situations. For instance:
2 If 8s12A ½$1;1" optimal decision is the same then this decision
will be accepted by the two DMs.
2 If they exist an optimal decision ðd1nÞ for s12A ½$1; a" with a
close to $1 and other one ðd2nÞ for s12A ½a;1" the decision d
1n
will be to be accepted by DM2.
5.4. Example
We illustrate the method in a general context, where DM1 does
not know if DM2 will take him/her decision according to the minmax
criterion (with probability 0.6) or Laplace's weighted average (with
probability 0.4) on the indicator f ðd1; d2;nÞ and DM1 hesitates
between the utility functions gðd1; d2;nÞ (with probability 0.7) and
hðd1; d2;nÞ (with probability 0.3) within the minmax criteria:
– C2 ¼ fminmax; Laplaceg
– C1 ¼ fg;hg
5.4.1. Evaluation of decision under uncertain criteria
DM1 has 2 possible decisions {1; 2} and DM2 has two possible
decisions {one, two} and nature induces three possible realizations
{a, b, c}. The evaluation of decision strategies is represented in
Table 1 and Fig. 5.
To solve this problem, we apply the method presented in
Section 5.2
– Step 1. Computation of C2ð d
2
%!
Þ for each vector d2
%!
AD
We have 4 vectors d2
%!
: 〈one; one〉; 〈one; two〉; 〈two; one〉;
〈two; two〉. For this 4 vectors we compute C2ð d
2
%!
Þ:
1. C2ð〈one; one〉Þ ¼∅
2. C2ð〈one; two〉Þ ¼ fminmaxg
3. C2ð〈two; one〉Þ ¼ fLaplaceg
4. C2ð〈two; two〉Þ ¼∅
– Step 2. Computation of C1;2ðd
1
; d2
%!
Þ for each vector
d2
%!
AfDjC2ð d
2
%!
Þa∅g and each d1AD1
We have 4 combinations ðd1; d2
%!
Þ with C2ð d
2
%!
Þa∅
ð1; 〈one; two〉Þ; ð 2; 〈one; two〉Þ; ð1; 〈two; one〉Þ and ð2; 〈two; one〉Þ
For this 4 combinations we compute C1;2ðd
1
; d2
%!
Þ:
1. C1;2ð1; 〈one; two〉Þ ¼ fðh;minmaxÞg
2. C1;2ð2; 〈one; two〉Þ ¼ fðg;minmaxÞg
3. C1;2ð1; 〈two; one〉Þ ¼ fðg; LaplaceÞ; ðh; LaplaceÞg
4. C1;2ð2; 〈two; one〉Þ ¼∅
– Step 3. Computation of C1ðd
1
Þ ¼ [
d2
%!
AD
C1;2ðd
1
; d2
%!
Þ for
each d1AD1
1. C1ð1Þ ¼
ðh;minmaxÞ; ðg; LaplaceÞ;
ðh; LaplaceÞ
( )
2. C1ð2Þ ¼ fðg;minmaxÞg
– Step 4. Computation of Pgðd1jDM1Þ
1. Pgð1jDM1Þ ¼∑C1ð1ÞPgðc
1Þ , Pgðc2Þ ¼ 0:3, 0:6þ0:7,
0:4þ0:3, 0:4¼ 0:58
2. Pgð2jDM1Þ ¼∑C1ð2ÞPgðc
1Þ , Pgðc2Þ ¼ 0:7, 0:6¼ 0:42
– Step 5. Computation of C12ðd
1
Þfor each decision d1AD1
First we compute min
d2AD2
d1
c2ðd1; d2Þ for d1AD1 and c2AC2
1. min
d2AD21
max
nAN
f ð1; d2;nÞ ¼ 10
2. min
d2AD22
max
nAN
f ð2; d2;nÞ ¼ 15
3. min
d2AD21
∑nAN
f ð1;d2 ;nÞ
jNj ¼ 7
4. min
d2AD22
∑nAN
f ð2;d2 ;nÞ
jNj ¼ 10
Then we compute:
1. argmin
d1AD1
ðmin
d2AD2
d1
max
nAN
f ð1; d2;nÞÞ
¼ argminðmin
d2AD21
max
nAN
f ð1; d2;nÞ;min
d2AD22
max
nAN
f ð2; d2;nÞÞ
¼ argminð10;15Þ ¼ 1
2. argmind1AD1 mind2AD2
d1
∑nAN
f ð1;d2 ;nÞ
jNj
' (
¼ argmin min
d2AD21
∑nAN
f ð1; d2;nÞ
jNj
;
 
min
d2AD22
∑nAN
f ð2; d2;nÞ
jNj
!
¼ argminð7;10Þ ¼ 1
From the previous results we build C12ð1Þ and C
1
2ð2Þ:
1. C12ð1Þ ¼ fminmax; Laplaceg
2. C12ð2Þ ¼∅
Table 1
Evaluation of the decision strategies.
DM1 DM2 f ðd1; d2;nÞ gðd1; d2;nÞ hðd1; d2;nÞ
max Laplace max max
1 one 10 8 10 12
two 14 7 11 10
2 one 20 10 14 11
two 15 12 9 15
Fig. 5. DT of the example.
–
– Step 6. Computation of Pgðd1jDM2Þ
1. Pgð1jDM2Þ ¼∑c2AC12ð1Þ
Pgðc2Þ ¼ 0:7þ0:3¼ 1
2. Pgð2jDM2Þ ¼∑c2AC12ð2Þ
Pgðc2Þ ¼ 0
5.4.2. Ranking of decisions taking into account the importance given
to DM2
In this example, we have Pgð1jDM1Þ ¼ 0:58; Pgð2jDM1Þ ¼ 0:42;
Pgð1jDM2Þ ¼ 1 and Pgð2jDM2Þ ¼ 0.
To help DM1 rank the decisions in terms of the importance given
by DM1to DM2, s
1
2 evolves from $1 (very low importance) to 1 (very
high importance). In order to summarize the knowledge and therefore
to visualize possible change in the decision-making, we collect
information in a table (Table 2). On the ﬁrst line, you ﬁnd the optimal
solution depending of the value of s12 recalled in line two. Thenwe give
for each decision d1AD1 the vector rearranged in increasing order.
From Table 2, DM1 chooses decision 1 whatever the importance
he/she gives to DM2 (best likelihood to be optimal for both DMs).
6. The case of imprecise optimism degrees
In this section, we consider the case of Hurwicz criterion with
imprecise value of optimism degree α. We describe how to
compute the sets C2ð d
2
%!
Þ, C1;2ðd
1
; d2
%!
Þ and C12ðd
1
Þ, in this context.
We detail some steps of this method when (i) both DM1 and DM2
criteria are Hurwicz criteria with respectively ~α1 and ~α21 the fuzzy
optimism degree of this criterion.
6.1. Determination of C2ð d
2
%!
Þ (step 1)
In this section, we give the framework of the algorithm to
compute C2ð d
2
%!
Þ:
– Step 1.1. Computation of the value of ~α21 for which decision d
2
j
changes, denoted by ~α2
change
, for each node of decision of DM2,
(cf: Fig.3)
– Step 1.2. Computation of the set of ~α21 such that vector d
2
%!
is
optimal for DM2: C2ð
~
d2 Þ
The maximal cardinality of C2ð
~
d2 Þ appears when all decisions
are optimal for a given α2 and each α2change are different for each
decision nodes of DM2. Thus, in the worst case, we have jD
1j , jD2j
sets C2ð d
2
%!
Þ.
6.2. Determination of C1;2ðd
1
; d2
%!
Þ(step 2)
After determining all C2ð d
2
%!
Þ, we compute the set C1;2ðd
1
; d2
%!
Þ
for each d1AD1. The outline of the algorithm is:
– Step 2.1. Computation of the value of α1 for which decision d1
changes, denoted by α1change, for each d
2
%!
such that C2ð d
2
%!
Þa∅,
(see Fig. 4 Section 4.2)
– Step 2.2. Computation of the set of α1 such that d2
%!
is the optimal
vector of DM2 and d
1 is the optimal decision of DM1: C1;2ðd
1
; d2
%!
Þ
In the worst case, we must compute jD1j for each C2ð d
2
%!
Þa∅
so at most jD1j2 , jD2j C1;2ðd
1
; d2
%!
Þ.
6.3. Determination of C12ðd
1
Þ (step 5)
In this section we present the algorithm to compute the set of
criteria giving an optimal solution the decision d1 of DM1. This
algorithm the result of C2ð d
2
%!
Þ
– Step 5.1. Computation, for each vector d2
%!
AC2ð d
2
%!
Þ, of the
value of α2 for which decision d1 changes, denoted by α1change,
for each d2
%!
such that C2ð d
2
%!
Þa∅, (see Fig. 4 Section 4.2)
– Step 5.2. Computation of the set of α1 such that d2
%!
is optimal
vector of DM2 and d
1 is optimal decision of DM1: C1;2ðd
1
; d2
%!
Þ
using Eq. (11)
C12ðd
1
Þ ¼ fc2jd1 ¼ argmin
d1AD1
ðmin
d2AD2
d1
uc2 ðd
1
;d2ÞÞg ð11Þ
7. Application of the method to an industrial case-study
In this section, we apply the method on a real-life case based
on a dyadic supply chain where the customer, a French worldwide
dermo-cosmetic maker (Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique), has to
choose a collaboration protocol (2 possibilities) with its packaging
product supplier. According to the traditional collaboration proto-
col the customer has to release orders (a product, a quantity) and
the supplier responds. A DM's decision variable is the order lead
time (here 12, 8 or 6 weeks). With the advanced collaboration
protocol the customer commits on purchases associated to a
family of products 8 weeks in advance (product family aggregation
is related to supplier's set up considerations). Then, the customer
releases delivery needs about the product 1 week in advance.
A DM's decision lever is the minimal volume associated to the
family engagement (here 50,000, 100,000 or 150,000 products).
7.1. Problem modeling
According to the notation deﬁned in previous parts, we denote
by DM1 the customer (PFDC) and by DM2 one of his packaging
suppliers. Two sequential decisions have to be made:
– DM1 has to deﬁne the collaboration protocol and its parameter
(6 possibilities) (Table 3),
– then, DM2 will deﬁne his lot sizing strategy (3 possibilities).
Table 2
Results taking into account the importance given to the DM2.
Optimal decision d¼1 d¼1 d¼1 d¼1 d¼1 d¼1 d¼1 d¼1 d¼1 d¼1 d¼1 d¼1 d¼1 d¼1 d¼1 d¼1 d¼1 d¼1 d¼1 d¼1 d¼1
s12 $1 $0.9 $0.8 $0.7 $0.6 $0.5 $0.4 $0.3 $0.2 $0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
d¼1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2
d¼2 $1 $0.9 $0.8 $0.7 $0.6 $0.5 $0.4 $0.3 $0.2 $0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
In addition, the performance of the supply chain will be subject
to a global uncertain event that models the uncertainty of the
performance due to different risk sources (scrap, production/
transport delay, breakdowns…) (7 possible situations).
According to the number of scenarios that have to be evaluated,
we use a simulation tool called LogiRisk for the evaluation of each
scenario (each leaf of the tree) on real data from PFDC (Marques,
2010). Developed in the Perl language, it is dedicated to tactical
and mostly strategic SC planning processes. This simulator is based
on a discrete event simulation modeling approach. Authors have
established a generic representation of the different planning
processes for each SC actor based on the MRPII (Manufacturing
Resource Planning) processes. An upstream planning process is
used between partners: plans are made by the customer and
passed to its suppliers. The procedure is repeated all over the chain
in the upstream direction. No information circulates downstream
(Lamothe et al., 2007, Marques et al., 2009).
The customer's cost function is 2/3 average customer's stock-
out 1/3 average customer's stock and supplier's cost function is 1/2
average supplier's stock-out 1/2 average supplier's inventory level.
7.2. Problem solving
The customer provides two possibility distributions on the
optimism degree of himself/herself and on the supplier. The
optimism degrees are represented in Fig. 6. Here, the DM1 is
optimistic (black line) and the DM2 is known to be pessimistic
(dotted line) by DM1.
From the simulation we build the decision tree (with 6 deci-
sions for DM1 {1;2;3;4;5;6} and 3 decisions for DM2 {1;2;3}) and
the cost function for each DM (DM1: customer's cost and DM2:
supplier's cost).
7.3. Determination of C2ð d
2
%!
Þ (step 1)
Decision 1 of DM2 is Pareto-optimal for all decisions of DM1. In
other words, decision 1 has the minimal “min” and minimal “max”
for each decision of DM1. So, whatever the optimism degree of
DM2, DM2 chooses decision 1 for each node.
C2ðð1;1;1;1;1;1ÞÞ ¼ ½0:5;1" 8 d
2
%!
a ð1;1;1;1;1;1Þ C2ð d
2
%!
Þa∅
7.4. Determination of C1;2ðd
1
; d2
%!
Þ(step 2)
Then we compute the set C1;2ðd
1
; ð1;1;1;1;1;1ÞÞ 8d1AD1.
Whatever the optimism degree of DM1, decisions 1,4,5,6 can be
chosen:
8d1a2;3 C1;2ðd
1
; ð1;1;1;1;1;1ÞÞa∅
DM1 has two possible optimal solutions: solution 2 and 3.
So we compute α1change (Fig. 7): C1;2ð2; ð1;1;1;1;1;1ÞÞ ¼ ½0;0:429"
and C1;2ð3; ð1;1;1;1;1;1ÞÞ ¼ ½0:429;0:5".
7.5. Computation of C1ðd
1
Þ (step 3)
In this example: C1ðd
1
Þ ¼ C12ðd
1
; ð1;1;1;1;1;1ÞÞ 8d1AD1:
C1ð2Þ ¼ C12ð2; ð1;1;1;1;1;1ÞÞ ¼ ½0;0:429"
C1ð3Þ ¼ C12ð3; ð1;1;1;1;1;1ÞÞ ¼ ½0:429;0:5"
Table 3
Decision protocols for DM1's decisions.
Notation Protocol decision Parameter decision
1 Advanced collaboration Low volume (50,000)
2 Advanced collaboration Medium volume (100,000)
3 Advanced collaboration High volume (150,000)
4 Basic order Little order lead time (6w)
5 Basic order Medium order lead time (8w)
6 Basic order Big order lead time (12w)
Fig. 6. Fuzzy optimism degree of DM1 and DM2.
Fig. 7. Comparative analysis of decisions 2 and 3.
Table 4
Data of decision tree of the case-study.
DM1 DM2 Supplier's cost Customer's cost
min max min max
1 1 7.175 7.696 0.471 0.537
2 14.516 17.563 0.415 0.475
3 20.436 25.396 0.411 0.453
2 1 6.022 6.907 0.422 0.462
2 13.078 14.34 0.380 0.425
3 18.92 21.57 0.375 0.414
3 1 5.905 6.956 0.414 0.468
2 12.975 14.734 0.382 0.420
3 18.267 21.257 0.374 0.412
4 1 6.177 7.272 0.547 0.656
2 11.862 14.444 0.505 0.605
3 17.268 20.824 0.478 0.554
5 1 6.427 6.946 0.571 0.622
2 12.131 13.985 0.567 0.624
3 17.540 20.445 0.542 0.639
6 1 7.307 7.549 0.765 1.009
2 13.010 14.628 0.763 1.009
3 18.968 21.294 0.765 1.008
0
0.5
1
1.5
0 0.5 1 1.5
2
3
Fig. 8. Conﬂict of decisions.
7.6. Computation of Pgðd1jDM1Þ (step 4)
To choose between decisions 2 and 3 we compute the pignistic
probability that decision 2 is optimal: Pgð2jDM1Þ ¼ Pgðα
1
A
½0;0:429"Þ , Pgðα2A ½0;1"Þﬃ0:992, 1 and the pignistic probability
that decision 3 is optimal: Pgð3jDM1Þ ¼ Pgðα
1
A ½0:429;0:5"Þ,
Pgðα2A ½0;1"Þﬃ0:008, 1¼ 0:008 (Table 4).
7.7. Determination of C12ðd
1
Þ (step 5)
We compute C12ðd
1
Þ for 1 to 6. Noted that the decision 1, 4,
5 and 6 are dominated by decision 2 and 3. But decision 3 is
optimal for α2A ½0:5;1". So we deduce that C12ð1Þ ¼ C
1
2ð2Þ ¼
C12ð4Þ ¼ C
1
2ð5Þ ¼ C
1
2ð6Þ ¼∅, and C
1
2ð3Þ ¼ ½0:5;1".
7.8. Computation of Pgðd1jDM2Þ (step 6)
So, Pgð1jDM2Þ ¼ Pgð2jDM2Þ ¼ 0 and Pgð3jDM2Þ ¼ 1.
A graphical representation of the resulting conﬂict of decisions
(step 7) is pictured (Fig. 8):
Based on the evaluation of the pignistic probability of each
decision of DM1 from the point of view of DM1 and DM2we
compute the optimal solution taking into account the importance
given by DM1to DM2 (Table 5).
In this case, the ﬁnal decision depends on the balance of power
between actors. Table 5 shows that the decision chosen by DM1
strongly depends on the importance given by DM1 to DM2. In fact,
if DM1 gives low importance to DM2 ðs
1
240;1Þ she/he imposes
decision 2 to DM2 otherwise DM1 will choose decision 3 to satisfy
DM2.
8. Conclusion
In this paper we focused on a decision problem in a dyadic
collaborative supply chain. More precisely we addressed the
problem of decision making for a customer, taking into account
the future decision of his supplier under imprecise information
on the criteria of the two SC partners. We proposed a decision
method ensuring optimal stability. In other words we focus
on the decision that has the best chance to be optimal under an
imprecise criterion.
Industrial DMs are daily faced to the issue of exploiting their
empirical knowledge of their partners' decisional behavior. This
knowledge is rarely precise and quantiﬁed. Being able to exploit
this knowledge may be a strategic advantage in term of value
creation and preservation. The model presented in this paper and
the associated case study illustrate the advantage to identify the
decision which has the best chance of being optimal under
imprecise knowledge, even if research efforts have to be made to
improve the robustness of the results and to use real life colla-
boration experience in order to improve the mutual knowledge of
partners' decisional behaviors.
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